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THE SL'PR£1-lE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

:HE STATE OF L'TAH,
Plain:iff-Res?ondent,
Case No.
J.~.\'ID

H.-'1.~'10:1

16421

~1El:iHART,

Jefendant-A~cellant.

-----------------------------------------------:U:i3llTAL i3RIEF OF APPELLANT

POI~T

I

THE l~TERROGATIO~ OF THE DEFENDANT AT POLICE
h:EA!:JQL'ARTERS ·,;As SLTFCIDlTLY CL:STODIAL A:m
SCFFICIE~T~Y COERCIVE AS TO REQL'IRE THE
"~ll?..A:WA :,·A~;:;::;G" AT THE OUTSET.

Respondent re:ies
-~~

·_· 5

5·J L.t::c.

~1-.

:-e oo:ice

o~~icer's

:~nsti:uti:na:
~c:

~a~e

a~nost

exclusively on Oregon v. Mathiason,

2d 71-". 97 S.Ct. 7ll (1977), in arguing that

failure :o acprise the defendant of his

ri~~:s

at the outset of the interrogation should

required ex::usion of the cefendant's eventual statement.

?.esponden: apoears :o ':Je arguing that
:n :ota! isolation
~=i:conJ.

33~

~rom

L' 5. :.36.

Suore~e

should be interpreted

the intent clearly expressed in Miranda v.
16 :._.Ed. 694. 86 S.Ct. 1602 (l966), and

T~e ~iranda
=~e

~lathiason

line of cases speak to and clarify

Court's concern

~ith

those interrogation situations
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the individual's will amd compell him to speak where he
would not likely otherwise do so.

Mathiason did not change th.J. t

concern, for such a holding would have overruled Miranda.
This central concern expressed in the Miranda line of cases
cannot be satisfied by the use of a simplified formula of
showing the lack of an actual arrest or by showing

that the

defendant was in fact physically free to leave if he chose to
do so.

While such facts

~be

crucial,

so~e

they are not t'"le

touchstones in determining the requirement for the ":lir:mda
warning".

If they were then the protections that

to guarantee would be ficticious.

~iranda

tries
:~at

Respondent's statenent

the Mathiason co•.1rt announced "restraint on freedom" as :r.e
determinative factor in establishing "custodial" interrogaticr.
is totally misleading.

clarif~cation

Mathiason represents a

o:

the Miranda rule and stands for the proposition that

[A] noncustodial situation is not converted
to one in which Miranda applies simplv
because .
the question~ng took p:ace
in a "coercive environment."
429 C.S. at 495.
This is not the same thing as saying that an arrest or i:s
S..:c~

functional equivalent is the only determinative .:'actor

a

holding would mean that a person "invited" to the station 'louse
and the told he was free to leave at any time

autonatica~:v

no right to be informed of his constitutional rights no
what other actions the police may take.

~atter

It requires ·:er:

creativity to see the potential for abusive and

~~'='=~"

uncons:~·~t-'r

interrogations arising from such a rule.
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has

:

~athiason

Cnquestionably,

narrows Miranda, but respondent

skips too lightly over those facts in Mathiason that bear
dir-ectly on the issue of "custodial" interrogation.

First

of ail, the defendant in >1athi3son •..Jas asked where he would
9refer to meet the detective 01nd subsequently agreed
state patrol office
told he

~as

total of 30

At the very outset Mathiason was specifically

not under
~inutes,

arres~.

~ook
I~

~c
~as
v-

one e:se

~ut

r~~~:s

:he

~e~32~3l

an~

~nderstanding
--~~.-~

~is

~n

:~e

supervision and undoubtedly well aware
~aiving

~ig~t

~n

fe::

In any event,

in :•athiascn exercised consider01ble
s~t~ation

and

~~·:e

~ase.

~~e

from

~he

outset;

the coercive

defendant likelv had sufficient

~een

verv short period during

~he

?Ut in

~eopardy.

the sworn testimony of the investi-

afterthought
:~e

them.

from the tine the defendant arrived

a: everv stage of

In :his oresen:

~~:errczat~rs

conducted by one detective, with

~inu~es

~ini~a:

~i~~::s

ei:her onlv as

~as

the consequences of

ce::'er.c~n:

::~=r~:

:ressures were

olace in an office rather than an

ac~ive

was :ess than five

- .. s ~""'.0:"::

The interview, which lasted a

:he defendant in the office. The defendant

a oaro:ee under
~is

on the

~e~e~dant

~v

the detectives. or after the

~ad

been

su~ficiently

Jetective 3ailess states that the
":re-·.,·ar-n~nz"
=~~~~~nee

)c

,

~:1:err-oga:io:t

:3sted onl:1 ~0 ~inuntes (T. 137).

:] :~~ ~~t2rr2;1::on :r~~scri?: itself will show this

::-~,;.:;

·~n.,!ere,;:~:c.•:'.:w

:":e er.tire

i:-~terrogation

lasted
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for two hours and 20 minutes, and took 44 l/2 pages for
transcription.

The beginning of the "Miranda warning" is

recorded on page 21.

Simple mathematics denies the detective's

estimate of the time spent questioning the defendant before anv
warning was given.

Indeed,

it may have been as much as one hour

before the defendant was first appraised of his constitutional
rights.

Detective Bailess further states that the entire time

was not taken up by questioning, but there were breaks

allow~ng

the defendant to go to the restroom or smoke a cigarette (T

l:j)

A complete reading of the interrogation transcript gives no
indication of such rest periods.

In fact,

the transcript of

the questioning indicates that the interrogation was on

contin~o~:

session beginning at 10:10 in the morning anc ending at

~~

Jj

that afternoon.
Several other factors strongly point to the probability that
the failure to give the defendant his rightful warnings at

~he

outset was either an oversight or part of a plov by the de:ective:
An examination of the pre-warning questions and ans•..;e:cs revea:s

no apparent attempts by the defendant to falsi:v his ans·N·ers
or to cover up his actions.

In fact,

Detective 3ailess stated

under oath that the pre-warning answers •..;ere consistent ·.-:itr.
his understanding of the facts at that tioe (Pre-trial :-!otion
Transcript,

18, 19).

Yet at the end of this period o: c;ues:ior.i-:

immediately prior to the "Miranda 1-:arning" the follo,,·:.ng
exchange took place:
Q.

Dave, your story is - a story
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A.

'..Jhat c1n I say,

Q

~ell,

you're not telling us the truth.

(Interrogat~on

place the defendant Nas,

20)

7ranscript,

concl~sion

The inescapable

I'm not lying.

is the before the interview even took

in the minds of the investigating officers,

:he cause of the injuries to the victim, and the sole point of
focus of the officer's investigation.
~ot

read~ng

onl? on a

testl~On?

a~

This conclusion is based

~nterrogation

of the

~imself

Officer 3ailess

transcript, but from the

(Pre-trial

~otion

Transcript,

15) .
:~is
~hen

:cnc_us~on

:a~es

en serious constitutional demensions

the fc:lawing sta:ecent,

ma~e

the interrogator during

j?

A statement that proves not only
:ha:

t~e

~e~e~ds~:

ac:ice officers had had ?rior
~efcre

the

Jc

,.
f~rs:

~nterrogation

~:ou

·Cr ::

~iscussions

took place,

with the

(a fact that the

desire :o consult Nith an attorney
~a·:e cne ~u~~~g :~~s i~terview?

_t's li~e we talked about.
~::'s _:.: ::o ·.rou
Y:~ ~~o~~ :~- you'2 :a:~ to an a:torney, he d tell
;au

~o:

ta:~ed

to sJ; anything
abou: t~at

You know that.

We

21. emphasis added)

-·

• ·-:::

.

::-2:3 :'·=-':-'.Cc:- ':
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in protecting the defendant's rights.

In reality,

the

significance on this statement is its proof of at least one
prior conversation the police officer had with the defendant
A conversation that, at minimum, discussed the drawbacks of the
defendant consulting an attorney.

This statement,

taken in contex:

of the entire interrogation, can have no other meaning and
Detective Bailess's sworn testimony of no prior discussions
defendant (Pre-trial Motion Transcript, 13, and T.
overcome this.

More importantly,

llC.) cannot

it is highly likel:: that trial

judge was misled by the officer's in-court
discussions

~i:~

state~ents

as to pr:or

(not to mention his statements regarding the

lengt~

a~

the pre-warning questioning and total duration and intensit:: of
the interrogation) .
Unlike Mathiason,

the defendant herein was tole to coce

down to the police station where a two hour-plus isolatec
interrogation took place, not in an office,
room.

but in

d

interrogac:~

Except for some prior conversation •..;ith these detecti·,es

where the necessity of an attorney for the defencant had '::·een
discussed,

the defendant had had no previous experiences

with the police or the criminal justice

syste~.

~n

cea_:~:

~iranda

established and Mathiason reaffirmed that a citizen mc:st '::e
appraised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to have an attorney present if he so chooses whenever he
undergoes:
.questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person
has been
.deprived of his freecom
of action in any significant wa::
429 U.S. at 474.
Mathiason does not hold that a defendant must be overtl_·

~~n-~~
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the opportunit? to leave the police station in order for
th~se

constitutional rights to attach.

si~nificantly

~eprived

David Meinhart had been

if his freedon to act pursuant

to those constitutional rights by the time the police got
around to informing him of those rights.

POl:'lT II
THE DEFE:lDA:!T DID :lOT KNOHINGLY AND
I:lTELLIGE:!TLY r,JAI'!E HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF I~CRIMI~ATION AND THCS HIS STATEMENT
~AS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED I:lTO EVIDENCE.
In Fare , . >L d-: a e l C .
:)Q

s ct.

?Osi::i..on

(19/9)

[~.

s.

, 61 L.Ed. 2d 197,

the Supreme Court rei:erated its long held

::~a:

af:er :he ~arnings are given the
accused, " [ ~] f the interrogation continues
without ~he oresence of an attorney and a
statec:cent :..a ta:Ze!1, a l":eav·y burden rests
on the ~overn~ent :o demonstrate that the
defenda;~ ~nowing:v and intelligently
~ai~·ed ~is ?rivilege agaisnt selfi~c~~mi~3ticn ~nd ~is rig~t to retained
or ~ppointed counsel
61 L.Ed. 2d at 212.
Jur~~~

~~e

Sta:e's

~e

~ad

no con:ac:

had

~is

~i:h

interro~ation state~ent

:ha~

::a

~ee:

t~is

burden, at pre-trial

:he defendant prior to the interview.
(suoted above) not onlv establishes

he h1d had ~ prior discuss~on. but indicates that he had

~::enp:ed
th~

~:reno:

to convince the defendant that it would not be in

2~~e~d3~:'s

~est

interests to ha·;e ~n attorney at that time.
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light how the trial court was likely misled in its
determination of the admissibility of the defendant's statement
In determining the voluntariness of a waiver the Fare
Court declares that the admLssibility of an accused's statement
is to be determined upon an examination of the "totality
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" (61 L.Ed.
2d at 212) and that this approach mandates inquiry

into the

accused's:
.age, experience, education background and intelligence and into whether
he has the capacity to understand the
warnines given him, the nature of
his Fifth Amendment rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights.
61 L.Ed. 2d at 212.
We have discussed in our initial brief the defendant's age,
background, and intelligence as they relate to his ca?acit:r
to make a voluntary waiver and therefore we will not :ucther
labor those points.

However,

it is crucial to underscore the

fact that by testifying that he had had no other conversations
(let alone a discussion on the merits of having an attorney).
with the defendant, Detective Bailess deprived the trial judge
of a full appreciation of the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's supposed waiver of his rights.
In the Fare case the 16 l/2 year old defendant,

implicate~

in a murder, was taken into custody and advised of his rights
Following several statements indicating a reluctance to talk to
police he made a number of incriminating admissions.

In

applying the "totality of the circumstances" test and in
voluntary waiver,

finci~:

the Court specifically noted the :ollo•,.;i.ng

Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for
digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services ~~e
factors:
the Law
defendant
had
considerable
ex?erience
~ith
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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police, he had a record of several arrests, he had served
~outh

time in a

camp, he had been on probation for several years,

he was under the full-time supervision of probation authorities,
he ·,1as not worn down by improper interrogation or lengthy
questioning nor was there any indications that he did not
understand his rights or the consequences of waiving them.
We would simply point out to this Court that David Meinhart
":-las none of the ?ersonal background the Surperne Court looked
tD in Fare, and that there are solid indications that David
~ein~art

did not fully understand his rights and the consequences

of waiver.

The defendant did not understand, and the trial

judge was never ?errnitted to see how or why that happened.

Respectfully submitted,

L~N R. BROw"N
Attorney for Appellant
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